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Introduction 
Innovation is widely acknowledged to be a major source of economic growth (Pavitt, 
1999). In advanced nations, both governments and companies look at innovation as a 
strategic weapon to benefit from globalization, and to survive its competitive pressures. 
However, in Asia (outside of Japan), imitation rather than innovation used to be the main 
focus of development strategies (Kim, 1997). Catching-up with manufacturing 
capabilities of advanced nations and out-foxing them by becoming faster and lower-cost 
followers have been the dominant objectives (Ernst and O’Connor, 1992; Hobday, 1995; 
Lall,  2000; Ernst, Gantiatsos, Mytelka, 1998; Mathews and Cho, 2000; Ernst, 2000).  
These strategies have produced impressive results. The emergence of East Asia as a 
global export manufacturing base during the last decades of the late 20
th century is one of 
the few success stories of Third World industrialization. In IT hardware manufacturing 
for instance, five Asian countries (China, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia) 
account for over one quarter of world production. Furthermore, while India has failed to 
excel as a global manufacturing exporter, the country has firmly established itself as a 
global export production base for software and information services. 
Over the last few years, something new seems to have happened (Ernst, 2003 c). In the 
midst of a global downturn in the IT industries, Asia’s leading IT exporting countries are 
all attempting to move beyond imitation. They appear to have seized upon new 
opportunities to create commercially successful innovations in the production of 
hardware, software, and services. These attempts to enter the global “innovation arms 
race” (Baumol, 2002) may well have significant implications for the region’s position in the global economy as well as for the possibilities and limitations of its development 
strategies. These developments are poorly understood and under-researched. We thus 
need to take stock of what is really happening. This paper briefly reviews what is new 
about emerging pathways to innovation in Asian electronics industries. I demonstrate that 
the role of Asia’s leading players in the electronics industry is changing - from global 
export production bases for hardware and software, a transition is under way to the 
creation of commercially viable innovations and standards. I argue that transformations 
in global markets, production and innovation systems are providing new opportunities for 
Asian firms that seek to improve their innovative capabilities. To use this potential, 
however, important changes are required in Asia’s innovation strategies, policies and 
management approaches. 
1. Pathways to Innovation 
Three important new developments characterize the emerging pathways to innovation 
in Asian IT industries (figure 1
1): i) global firms are expanding and upgrading their R&D 
centers in Asia; ii) leading Asian firms are emerging as new sources of innovation and 
global standards; and iii) this may create new opportunities for smaller Asian firms (the 
“new technology-based firms” or NTBFs) to enter diverse innovation networks as 
specialized  suppliers.       
Most of the literature on R&D internationalization has focused on the relocation of 
R&D among industrialized countries (e.g., Granstrand, Hakanson and Sjoelander, 1993; 
Patel and Pavitt, 1998). However, global corporations have substantially increased their 
R&D in emerging economies, primarily in the above leading Asian electronics exporting 
                                                           
1 All figures and tables are in the appendix 
  2countries (Reddy, 2000; Liu and Chen, 2003; Ernst, 2003b). This is especially the case in 
the electronics industry, due to its heavy exposure to three characteristics of the “global 
networks economy“ that I will describe in part 2 of this paper: vertical specialization, 
global network integration, and the use of IT-based information management. Global 
corporations in the electronics industry (the “network flagships”) increasingly rely on 
international knowledge sourcing to manage their geographically dispersed global 
production, distribution and innovation networks (Ernst, 2003a). The network flagships 
relocate R&D to locations with lower cost of knowledge workers. Equally important is 
proximity to higher-end specialized network suppliers of components, manufacturing 
services and knowledge-intensive business services, especially design and engineering 
support services. 
The main carriers of relocating R&D to lower-cost locations in Asia are global brand 
leaders (e.g. Intel), as well as global higher-tier suppliers, such as manufacturing and 
design service providers like Flextronics or HonHai or specialized global suppliers of 
“silicon intellectual property” (SIP), like ARM. All of these firms are currently 
expanding and upgrading their R&D centers in Asia. They are also outsourcing R&D 
activities (mostly “blue-collar” design and engineering implementation) to specialized 
Asian R&D suppliers. Primary locations for such R&D centers and for the outsourcing of 
R&D are China, India, Taiwan, Korea and Singapore. But the redeployment of R&D 
centers by global corporations now also covers specialized clusters in lower-tier countries 
like Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam. 
A second important new development is that leading firms from China, India, Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore are emerging as potential new sources of innovation and global 
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design), digital consumer devices, wireless telecommunication systems, and business 
process software. Again, a few illustrative examples should highlight the potentially far-
reaching implications. 
Chip design, a process that creates the greatest value in the electronics industry, has 
recently experienced a massive geographic dispersion to East Asia (figure 2). Excluding 
Japan, the region’s share in the global production of chip designs is projected to grow 
from around 30% in 2002 to more than 50% in 2008 (iSuppli, 2003). Taiwan has 
emerged as a primary new location for chip design: five of the top 20 world market 
leaders are from Taiwan. Korea is following closely behind, with the chip design 
departments of Samsung, SK Telecom, KT, LG Telecom as the main drivers. The 
creation of commercial chip designs is also rapidly growing in China and Singapore.  
Patents, a widely used proxy for innovative capabilities, also indicate substantial 
progress. Among patents granted in the U.S., Taiwan did not show up in 1990 among the 
10 top countries. Ten years later, in 2000, Taiwan was ranked fourth (with 4,667 patents 
granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office), ahead of France and the UK, and Korea 
was # 8, ahead of Italy, Sweden and Switzerland (figure 3).  
In digital consumer devices and mobile communications systems, serious efforts have 
been made to upgrade system development and standard-setting capabilities, 
especially in “Greater China” (including Taiwan and Hong Kong) and in Korea. For 
instance, in consumer electronics, there are joint efforts by China and Taiwan to 
develop a new video-disk technology format, called EVD (enhanced versatile disk) that 
would allow resolution five times higher than the current de facto industry standard 
  4DVD, while helping China’s consumer electronics industry to escape full royalty 
payments to the dominant DVD licensing groups. Beijing E-World Technology, a 
consortium of 10 Chinese DVD manufacturers, is conducting government-sponsored 
research, in collaboration with Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), 
and Taiwanese disk makers and chip design houses.  
In telecommunications, Korea’s afore-mentioned four leading players are all engaged 
in serious efforts to become major platform and contents developers for complex 
technology systems, especially in mobile communications. These efforts can build on 
considerable capabilities, accumulated in public research labs (like ETRI, the Electronics 
and Telecommunications Research Institute), as well as in R&D labs of the chaebol, to 
develop complex technology systems like TDX (a switching system) and communication 
systems that are based on the CDMA (= code-division multiple access) standard. 
Another important example is China’s attempt to develop an alternative third 
generation (3G) digital wireless standard, called TD-SCDMA (time-division synchronous 
code-division multiple access), for which it received approval by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) in August 2000. The two dominant competing global 
3G standards are W-CDMA (compatible with existing GSM operations, and supported by 
European firms), and CDMA 2000 (compatible with existing CDMA operations, and 
supported by US firms). The TD-SCDMA standard was developed by Datang Telecom, a 
Chinese state-owned enterprise, and the Research Institute of the Ministry of Information 
Industry, with technical assistance from Siemens.  To accelerate the implementation of 
this strategy, Datang has formed a series of collaborative agreements: a joint venture with 
Nokia, Texas Instruments, the Korean LG group, and Taiwanese ODM (= original design 
  5manufacturing) suppliers, a joint venture with Philips and Samsung, and a licensing 
agreement with STMicroelectronics that will provide the Chinese company with access 
to critical design building blocks. Such linkages illustrate how integration into global 
production networks may facilitate Asian attempts to create commercially successful 
innovations (see part 2). 
Of course no serious observer would claim that China, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore 
will soon overtake the US, as well as Europe and Japan, as the global leading centers of 
innovation. Indeed, there is ample evidence that the sources of innovation remain highly 
concentrated. Of global R&D, 86% takes place in industrialized countries, with the U.S. 
occupying the leading position with 37% (Dahlman and Aubert, 2001,p.34). For instance, 
the R&D budget of a U.S. industry leader, Microsoft, at around $ 6.2 billion (for 2003), 
exceeds China’s total R&D budget. The U.S. has raced ahead in the most prized areas of 
technological innovation, as far as these can be measured by patent statistics. The US 
“innovation score” measures the number of patents granted by the US Patent Office, 
multiplied by an index that indicates the value of these patents
2. Since 1985, the US 
“innovation score” has more than doubled, a rate far better than any other country (CHI 
Research, 2003). In 2002, all 15 leading companies with the best record on patent 
citations were based in the US, with nine of them in the IT sector (CHI/MIT 2003). 
However, while the capability to produce innovations remains highly unequally 
distributed, there are clear signs that Asia’s leading electronics exporting countries are 
                                                           
2 The citation index measures the frequency of citation of a particular patent. When the US Patent 
Office publishes patents, each one includes a list of other patents from which it is derived. The more often 
a patent is cited, the more likely it is a pioneering patent, connected with important inventions and 
discoveries. An index of more than 1 indicates that patents are cited more often than would be expected for 
a specific group of technologies, while less than 1 indicates they are cited less often than expected (Narin, 
2000) 
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In a handful of emerging centers of excellence in Asia, sophisticated innovation and 
research capabilities appear to have followed the earlier development of electronics 
manufacturing capabilities. 
2. Global Transformations and the Mobility of Knowledge 
The new push into cutting-edge research and innovation in our sample countries may 
actually be less surprising than it may look at first sight. It reflects the new mobility of 
knowledge through vertical specialization into global production and innovation 
networks, which in turn may provide new opportunities for “late innovation” strategies. 
Late innovators have easier access to international knowledge sources, due to four recent 
transformations in the global innovation system that encompass the “global network 
economy” (Ernst, 2003d): (1) global flagship networks integrate geographically dispersed 
production, distribution and innovation bases;  (2) global firms outsource R&D to 
locations with lower costs of knowledge workers; (3) brain drain has produced 
transnational knowledge communities that can act as highly effective carriers of tacit 
knowledge; and (4) ICT-enhanced information management can improve the 
coordination of these diverse networks.   
Figure 4 provides a stylized model of how vertical specialization (i.e. the dis-
integration of firm organization and the geographic dispersion across national 
boundaries) and re-integration of dispersed production, distribution and innovation bases 
into hierarchical global flagship networks facilitate knowledge diffusion. Figure 4 also 
demonstrates the role played by two complementary enabling forces in enhancing both 
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transnational knowledge communities.  
Let us first look at the latter two enabling factors. In all Asian countries, but especially 
in China, earlier “brain drain” has produced overseas communities of engineers, scholars, 
and managers who are familiar with cutting-edge technology and best-practice 
management approaches and who understand the dynamics of international product and 
financial markets. These transnational knowledge communities can play an important 
catalytic role in the development of domestic innovative capabilities (Saxenian, 2002). 
The use of ICT as a management tool can enhance the scope for knowledge sharing 
among multiple network participants at distant locations (Ernst, 2003a). But these 
changes will occur only gradually, as a long-term, iterative learning process, based on 
search and experimentation. The digitization of knowledge implies that it can be 
delivered as a service and built around open standards. This has fostered the 
specialization of knowledge creation, giving rise to a process of modularization, very 
much like earlier modularization processes in hardware manufacturing. As a result, one 
of the most important recent developments that affect international knowledge diffusion 
is the rapidly growing trade in intellectual property rights (IPR).  
Under the heading of “e-business”, a new generation of networking software 
provides a greater variety of tools for representing knowledge, including low-cost audio-
visual representations (Foray and Steinmueller, 2001). Those programs also provide 
flexible information systems that support not only information exchange among 
dispersed network nodes, but also the sharing, utilization, and creation of knowledge 
among multiple network participants at remote locations (Jørgensen and Kogstie, 2000). 
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chains, and customer relations. Equally important are new opportunities for the joint 
production across distant locations of knowledge support services (e.g., software 
engineering and development, business process outsourcing, maintenance and support of 
information systems, as well as skill transfer and training). While much of this is still at 
an early stage of “trial-and-error”, global network flagships in the electronics industry 
now face a huge potential for extending knowledge exchange across organizational and 
national boundaries. However, the uncertainties and complexities of operating in global 
markets means that there are agglomeration economies to be derived from dense spatial 
concentrations of specialized network suppliers. Hence, new opportunities emerge for 
pathways to innovation in Asian electronics industries. 
  “Vertical specialization” (or “outsourcing” in common parlance) is no longer 
restricted to the production of goods and services but now extends to all stages of the 
value chain, including research and new product development. This may facilitate the 
implementation of “late innovation” strategies in leading Asian electronics exporting 
countries. Take chip design (Ernst, 2003b). Until the mid-1980s, captive semiconductor 
producers (like IBM) and merchant firms (like Intel) did almost all their chip design in-
house. The first step of vertical specialization was the separation of fabrication and 
design.  The emergence of independent providers of pure-play “silicon foundry” services 
gave rise to a proliferation of “fabless” design houses (like Altera) that focused on 
specific niche markets for integrated circuits. 
Over time, a second stage of vertical specialization has occurred within the process of 
chip design itself.  A primary driver has been a widening productivity gap between 
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twenty years has seen a 58% compounded annual growth, the productivity of chip design 
has lagged behind, with only a 21% compounded annual rate (Figure 5).  Given this 
design productivity gap, differences in the cost of employing a chip design engineer have 
become an important determinant for decisions on where to locate chip design. In light of 
the fact that the annual cost of employing a chip design engineer in East Asia is between 
10 and 20% of the cost in Silicon Valley (Figure 6), it is hardly surprising to find that 
chip design is being relocated to leading electronics clusters in East Asia that provide a 
skilled and re-trainable workforce as well as easy access to foundry, assembly and testing 
services. In addition, radical changes in the methodology of chip design through the so-
called system-on-chip (SOC) design have arguably further enhanced the scope of vertical 
specialization within the process of design.  Due to the growing complexity of the design 
process, a single company is no longer exclusively handling the design for a specific 
chip.  Instead, many companies are contributing, based upon their specific areas of 
expertise.  This leads to the development of “global electronic design networks” that link 
together design houses, the licensors of specific design building blocks, design service 
providers, foundries, design tool vendors, design departments of large electronics 
systems, and brand name companies that are all contributing to the complete chip design 
solution. 
But vertical specialization does not imply that the “Visible Hand” of large 
manufacturing firms will become invisible (as argued, for instance, in Langlois, 2001), 
giving rise to a resurgence of market forces. “Integration” is the necessary complement to 
vertical specialization, and the resultant geographic dispersion: large global corporations 
  10(the network flagships) can act as system integrators for the diverse, multi-layered 
production and innovation networks that have evolved as a result of vertical 
specialization (Borrus, Ernst, Haggard, 2000; Ernst, 2002b; Pavitt, 2003). Trade 
economists have recently discovered the importance of changes in the organization of 
international production as a determinant of trade patterns (for example, Feenstra, 1998; 
Jones and Kierzskowski, 2000; Cheng and Kierzkowski, 2001). Their work demonstrates 
that (i) production is increasingly ‘fragmented’, with parts of the production process 
being scattered across a number of countries, hence increasing the share of trade in parts 
and components; (ii) that there is reintegration through global production networks; and 
(iii) that countries and regions which have been able to become a part of these network 
are the ones which have industrialized the fastest.  
Our model of GFNs builds on this work, but uses a broader concept that emphasizes 
three essential characteristics (Ernst, 2002a and b): i) scope: GFNs encompass all stages 
of the value chain, not just production; ii) asymmetry: flagships dominate control over 
network resources and decision-making; and iii) knowledge diffusion: global corporations 
(the “network flagships”) construct these networks to gain quick access to skills and 
capabilities at lower-cost overseas locations that complement their core competencies. 
Knowledge-sharing is the glue that keeps these networks growing.  Flagships need to 
transfer technical and managerial knowledge to local suppliers to ensure that they meet 
the technical specifications mandated by the flagships. Originally this involved primarily 
operational skills and routine procedures required for sales and distribution, 
manufacturing and logistics. Over time, knowledge sharing also incorporates higher-
level, mostly tacit forms of “organizational knowledge” required for control, 
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and Kim, 2002). 
In short, the reintegration of geographically dispersed specialized production and 
innovation sites into multi-layered GFNs and the increasing use of IT-based information 
systems to manage these networks are gradually reducing constraints to international 
knowledge diffusion. GFNs expand inter-firm linkages across national boundaries, 
increasing the need for knowledge diffusion, while information systems enhance not only 
information exchange, but also the sharing and joint creation of knowledge. This new 
mobility of knowledge provides new opportunities for pathways to innovation in leading 
Asian electronics exporting countries. 
3. Policy Implications 
To reap these opportunities, considerable changes are required in Asia’s innovation 
strategies, policies and management approaches. Research on Asian innovation systems 
(e.g., Kim Linsu, 1993 and 1997; Lall, 2000; Hobday, 1995; Ernst, Mytelka and 
Ganiatsos, 1998; Mathews and Cho, 2000; Naughton and Segal, 2001; Liu and White, 
2001; Yusuf, 2003; Amsden and Chu, 2003; Segal, 2003) has emphasized that peculiar 
features of economic structures and institutions offer quite distinct possibilities for 
learning and innovation, and hence should be reflected in the design of innovation 
strategies. Asia’s electronics exporting countries thus have to develop their own 
idiosyncratic approaches to innovation strategies, policies and innovation management. 
As latecomers to innovation, they are confronted with substantial barriers. At the same 
time, being a latecomer also conveys important advantages, as it is possible to learn from 
the mistakes of earlier latecomers to innovation. 
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find out, we use a simple taxonomy of Asian innovation strategies (Figure 7). Much of 
the debate has focused on the transition from “catching-up” to “fast-follower strategies” 
(e.g., Mathews and Cho, 2000; Chang and Tsai, 2002). “Catching-up” requires the 
mastery of capabilities that are necessary to implement, assimilate and improve foreign 
technologies (Kim, 1980). This set of primarily operational capabilities makes it possible 
to enter a product market after growth has peaked, and to do so as a low-cost producer. 
“Fast-follower strategies” on the other hand aim at entering a product market right at the 
beginning of its high growth stage. This requires a broader set of capabilities that now 
also includes certain aspects of innovation. However, the primary focus of innovation in 
“fast-follower strategies” is on organizational arrangements that make it possible to 
combine quick market response (“time compression”), flexible production and systemic 
cost control across all stages of the value chain through supply chain and customer 
relations management.  
Asia’s leading electronics exporting countries have all successfully made that 
transition, either for hardware or for software production. This raises the question where 
to move to from “fast-follower” strategies. Research on innovation strategies in 
industrialized countries (e.g., OECD, 2000) points to “technology leader” strategies. Here 
the objective is to become a prime mover of knowledge creation, and to set global 
standards during product introduction. The ultimate objective is to create new 
“intellectual property rights”, especially a broad portfolio of frequently cited “pioneer” 
patents connected with important inventions and discoveries. However, jumping right 
into “technology leader” strategies to compete head-on with global technology leaders is 
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finance a massive increase of R&D/sales ratios. This in turn necessitates high margins 
based on premium pricing during product introduction.  
Most importantly, “technology leader” strategies require a massive upgrading of 
innovative capabilities. As with all changes involving complex technological knowledge, 
this will be a “difficult, painful and uncertain” (Pavitt, 1999:p.XI) process. To illustrate 
this, I use a classification of technological complexity of different categories of R&D, 
developed in Amsden and Tschang (2003). “Fast follower” strategies demanded 
capabilities in both “process development” (to reduce costs, uncertainties and time-to-
market of manufacturing, and to improve flexibility) and “prototype development” (to 
implement a product or system design as an engineered system through detailed product 
design and engineering samples). “Technology leader” strategies however require a 
broad set of capabilities in “applied research” (to transform, modify and recombine 
known technologies so that they fit new applications), “basic research” (to apply new 
knowledge for radically new marketable products), as well as in “pure science” (to 
uncover new scientific principles). To develop such a portfolio of demanding capabilities 
needs time. 
  Industrial latecomers may however have an intermediate option: “technology 
diversification”. Defined as “the expansion of a company´s or a product´s technology 
base into a broader range of technology areas” (Granstrand, 1998:472), such strategies 
are an attempt to reap technology-related economies of scope. Technology diversification 
focuses on products that draw “… on several... crucial technologies which do not have to 
be new to the world or difficult to acquire" (Granstrand and Sjoelander, 1990: p.37). In 
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on “applied research”. Technology diversification also implies that a company increases 
its reliance on outside sources of complementary technologies, including foreign ones. 
Empirical research on Japanese, U.S. and Swedish companies has demonstrated that 
technology diversification plays a more important role than technology substitution, as 
seen from the larger number of old technologies in a current product generation, 
compared to the number of obsolete technologies (Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt, 1997) 
Conclusions 
  To conclude, the four global transformations discussed above have created 
opportunities for late innovators to engage in technology diversification that did not exist 
before. Asia’s leading electronics exporting countries may also have important latecomer 
advantages. They can learn from the earlier experience of Japanese firms that have 
played a pioneering role in the development of technology diversification strategies 
(Kodama, 1986; Odagiri and Goto, 1992). Japanese firms pursued this strategy for three 
reasons: to compensate for the decreasing returns of their existing manufacturing exports; 
to develop generic technologies that could form the base for penetrating future growth 
markets; and to avoid the high cost and uncertainty of “technology leader” strategies. 
Second, technology diversification can also build on existing strengths of Asia’s leading 
electronics exporting countries in both “process development” and “prototype 
development”, especially imitation and adaptive engineering, as well as detailed design.  
And third, Asian firms in the above countries can build on their accumulated capabilities 
to implement, assimilate and improve foreign technologies, as technology diversification 
often involves the exchange of knowledge with foreign parties. 
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What is new?
1. Global firms are expanding & upgrading their R&D centers in Asia
• global flagships (Intel) ↔ global suppliers (ARM)
• China, India, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore ↔ Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, 
Vietnam
• product customization & process adjustment → chip & system design
2. Asian firms emerging as new sources of innovation and global standards
• chip fabrication & design
• patents
• digital consumer devices
• wireless telecommunication systems    
• business process software
3.  New opportunities for local NTBFs to enter diverse innovation networks
as specialized suppliers of 
• knowledge-intensive support services






















Chip design moves to Asia* 
>50 30 Asia’s share in global 
production of chip designs 
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*Asia = Taiwan, South Korea, India, China, 
Singapore, Malaysia
Source: iSuppli report on IC design, March 2003
Figure 2.  
 
  18Figure 3.  
 
 
Country Ranking of Patents Granted in the U.S., 
1990 to 2000
Switzerland (1,322) Sweden (806) Taiwan (732) 11.
Sweden (1,577) Switzerland 
(1,056)
Sweden (768) 10.
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U.K. (3,667) Canada (2,104) Canada (1,859) 6.
France (3,819) U.K. (2,478) U.K. (2,789) 5.
Taiwan (4,667) France (2,821) France (2,866) 4.
Germany (10,234) Germany (6,600) Germany (7,614) 3.
Japan (31,296) Japan (21,764) Japan (19,525) 2.
US (85,072) US (55,739) US (47,390) 1.
2000 1995 1990 Rank/year
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, January 2002
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Widening Design Productivity Gap in Integrated Circuits
1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002
Moore’s Law (K Logic Transistors per Chip)
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*= including salary, benefits, equipment, office space and other infrastructure.
Sources: PMC-Sierra Inc, Burnaby, Canada (for Silicon Valley, Canada, Ireland, India); 
plus interviews (Taiwan, South Korea, China)
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